We consider an economy where agents' consumption sets are given by the cone L 0 + of non-negative measurable functions and whose preferences are defined by additive utilities satisfying the Inada conditions. We extend to this setting the results in Dana [1] on the existence and uniqueness of Arrow-Debreu equilibria. In the case of existence, our conditions are necessary and sufficient.
Main results
This paper states necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Arrow-Debreu equilibria in the economy where agents' consumption sets are given by the cone L 0 + of non-negative measurable functions and whose preferences are defined by additive utilities satisfying the Inada conditions. For completeness, a version of a well-known uniqueness criteria is also provided. The results generalize those in Dana [1] ; see Remarks 1.7 and 1.8 for details.
Consider an economy with M ∈ {1, 2, . . .} agents and a state space (S, S, µ) which is a measure space with a σ-finite measure µ. By L 0 we denote the space of (equivalence classes of) measurable functions with values in [−∞, ∞); L 0 + stands for the cone of non-negative measurable functions. For α ∈ L 0 we use the convention:
The consumption set of mth agent equals L 0 + and his preferences are defined by additive utility:
The utility measurable field U m : [0, ∞) → L 0 has the following properties.
Assumption 1.1. For every s ∈ S the function U m (·)(s) on (0, ∞) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuously differentiable, and satisfies the Inada conditions:
At c = 0, by continuity, U m (0)(s) = lim c↓0 U m (c)(s); this limit may be −∞.
Remark 1.2. This framework readily accommodates consumption preferences which are common in Mathematical Finance. For instance, it includes a continuous-time model defined on a filtered probability space (Ω, F, (F t ) t≥0 , P) where the agents consume according to an optional non-negative process α = (α t ) of consumption rates; so that C t = t 0 α v dv is the cumulative consumption up to time t. In this case, the state space S = Ω × [0, ∞), S is the optional σ-algebra, and µ(ds) = µ(dω, dt)
By Λ ∈ L 0 + we denote the total endowment in the economy. A family
we denote the initial allocation of Λ between the agents. Definition 1.3. A pair (ζ, (α m 1 ) m=1,...,M ), consisting of a measurable function ζ > 0 (a state price density) and an allocation (α m 1 ) of Λ (an equilibrium allocation) is an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium if
and, for m = 1, . . . , M ,
This is the main result of the paper. 
Corollary 1.5. Suppose that Assumption 1.1 holds, the total endowment Λ > 0, the initial allocation α m 0 = 0, m = 1, . . . , M , and
Then an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium exists.
Proof. The concavity of U m implies that
and the result follows from Theorem 1.4 where one can take α m = 1 M Λ. The Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is, in general, not unique; see, e.g. Example 15.B.2 in Mas-Colell et al. [4] which can be easily adapted to our setting. We state a version of a well-known uniqueness criteria. 
Then an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium exists and is unique.
The proofs of Theorems 1.4 and 1.6 are given in Section 3 and rely on the finite-dimensional characterization of Arrow-Debreu equilibria in Theorem 2.4. Remark 1.7. Being necessary and sufficient, the condition (2) improves the sufficient criteria in Dana [1] . This paper requires the existence of conjugate exponents p, q ∈ [1, ∞], 
and sup
Here U (w, c) is the aggregate utility measurable field, see (5) below, and Σ M is the simplex in R M .
Remark 1.8. If the utility measurable fields (U m ) are twice differentiable, then the key condition (3) is equivalent to the boundedness by 1 of their relative risk-aversions −cU ′′ m (c)/U ′ m (c) and, in this form, is well-known; see, e.g., Example 17.F.2 and Proposition 17.F.3 in Mas-Colell et al. [4] , Theorem 4.6.1 in Karatzas and Shreve [3] , and Dana [1] . Note that, contrary to the above references, we allow this condition to fail for one economic agent.
Pareto optimal allocations
In this section we state the properties of Pareto optimal allocations needed for the proofs of Theorems 1.4 and 1.6.
and there is no allocation (β m ) of Λ which dominates (α m ) in the sense that
and
See Remark 2.3 for a justification of the integrability condition (4). As usual, in the study of complete equilibria, an important role is played by the aggregate utility measurable field U = U (w, c) :
Here R M + is the non-negative orthant in R M without the origin:
Due to the 1-homogeneity property of U = U (w, c) with respect to the weight w: U (yw, c) = yU (w, c), y > 0, it is often convenient to restrict its w-domain to the simplex
Elementary arguments show that for every w ∈ R M + the measurable field U (w, ·) on [0, ∞) satisfies Assumption 1.1 and that the upper bound in (5) is attained at the measurable functions π m (w, c), m = 1, . . . , M , such that
These identities readily imply that the measurable fields π m : 
Proof. Assume first that (α m ) is Pareto optimal. By the concavity of the measurable fields (U m ), the set
is convex and, in view of (4), it has a non-empty interior. From the Pareto optimality of (α m ) we deduce that the point
belongs to the boundary of C. Hence, there is a non-zero w ∈ R M such that
Since C − [0, ∞) M = C, we obtain that w m ≥ 0. Then we can normalize w to be in Σ M . Observe now that (9) can be written as
which readily implies (8).
Conversely, if (α m ) is given by (8), then for any allocation (β
which yields the Pareto optimality of (α m ) after we account for the integrability condition (4) and recall that α m π m (w, Λ) = 0 if w m = 0.
Remark 2.3. Without the integrability condition (4) in Definition 2.1 the assertion of Theorem 2.2 does not hold. As a counter-example, take M = 2 and select the total endowment and the utility functions so that Λ > 0, U 1 = U 2 , and
Then the allocation (π 1 (1/2, Λ), π 2 (1/2, Λ)) = (Λ/2, Λ/2) is dominated by either (0, Λ) or (Λ, 0).
After these preparations, we are ready to state the main result of this section. 
In this case, the equilibrium allocation (α m 1 ) is Pareto optimal.
Remark 2.5. As Lemma 3.1 below shows, the integrability condition (12) holds for some w ∈ int Σ M if and only if it holds for every w ∈ int Σ M and is equivalent to the existence of an allocation (α m ) of Λ satisfying (2).
For the proof of the theorem we need a lemma.
Lemma 2.6. Let U : [0, ∞) → L 0 be a measurable field satisfying Assumption 1.1 and α > 0 and ζ > 0 be measurable functions such that E[ζα] < ∞, and
Proof. Let β be a measurable function such that
For instance, we can choose β so that
where the measurable function η > 0 and E[η] < ∞. Observe that
where the second bound holds because
Take a measurable function γ such that |γ| ≤ β and E[ζγ] = 0.
From the properties of U in Assumption 1.1 we deduce that for |y| < 1:
Accounting for the integrability of U (α) and U (α − β) we obtain that the function
is continuously differentiable and
As α is optimal, f attains its maximum at y = 0. Therefore,
Thus, we have found a measurable function β > 0 such that (15) holds and
This readily implies (14). Indeed, if we define the probability measures P and Q as dP dµ
and dQ dµ
then for a set A ∈ S the implication (16) with
. Hence, P = Q and the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 2.4. Assume first that (ζ, (α m 1 )) is an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. We claim that (α m 1 ) is a Pareto optimal allocation of Λ. Indeed, if there is an allocation (β m ) of Λ which dominates (α m 1 ) in the sense of Definition 2.1 then for some l ∈ {1, . . . , M } either
, contradicting the optimality of α l 1 in (1). From Theorem 2.2 we then obtain the representation (11) for (α m 1 ) with w ∈ Σ M . As α m 0 = 0, we have α m 1 = 0. Hence, w ∈ int Σ M and α m 1 = π m (w, Λ) > 0. Lemma 2.6 and the identities (6) now imply (10). Finally, the properties (12) and (13) are parts of Definition 1.3.
Conversely, let w ∈ int Σ M be such that the conditions (12) and (13) hold and define (ζ, (α m 1 )) by (10) and (11). Except (1) all conditions of Definition 1.3 hold trivially. The property (1) follows from the inequalities
where β m ∈ L 0 + and, at the last step, we used the definition of π m in (6).
3 Proofs of Theorems 1.4 and 1.6
We begin with some lemmas.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that Assumption 1.1 holds, the total endowment Λ > 0, and there is an allocation (α m ) of Λ satisfying (2) . Then
Proof. First, take w ∈ int Σ M . From the monotonicity and the concavity of U m we deduce that
and from the definition of π m that
These inequalities readily imply (17).
In view of (19), we obtain that w ∈ int Σ M . From (20) we deduce the existence of an index l such that f l ( w) ≥ 0. Then
Another use of (20) yields the result.
Proof of Theorem 1.4. The "only if" part follows directly from Theorem 2.4, which, in particular, implies that the inequality (2) holds for any equilibrium allocation (α m 1 ). Conversely, assume that (2) holds for some allocation (α m ) of Λ. From Lemma 3.1 we obtain the bound (18). The dominated convergence theorem and the continuity of the measurable fields π m (·, Λ) and U c (·, Λ) on Σ M imply the continuity of the functions
In view of (7) and as α m 0 = 0 the functions (f m ) satisfy (19) and since Proof of Theorem 1.6. The existence follows from Corollary 1.5. To verify the uniqueness we define the excess utility functions: This contradiction concludes the proof.
